In the past, states hesitated to recognize decisions of foreign courts on political grounds, as such recognition de facto implied the acceptance of the authority of a foreign state. These obstacles were eliminated by private arbitration, and arbitration, as a means of dispute resolution that replaces state authority, has increasingly been employed where the latter has, for a variety of reasons, proven inefficient and defective. We must strictly distinguish between the right to court proceedings (the right to have one’s case dealt with by a court) and the right to legal protection. Th e right to court proceedings can be waived on the basis of the principle of the autonomy of will (for instance, by means of an arbitration agreement entered into in compliance with the lex arbitri). The right to legal protection cannot be waived. Arbitration is therefore a process of finding and applying the law. However, such legal protection must be approved by the law (laws and regulations) applicable at the seat of arbitration. An arbitration agreement as a manifestation of autonomy only initiates this dispute resolution mechanism within the framework laid down by the lex arbitri. This condition is a necessary prerequisite for attributing legal force to arbitration awards, which are therefore enforceable by public authority. The state assumes no responsibility for the provision of legal protection via private mechanisms (arbitration). Arbitration tribunals do not represent public authority, but are nonetheless instruments of legal protection. While it is permissible for principles of fair trial to be restricted in arbitration, they may not be entirely excluded, and the minimum necessary standard thereof must be preserved.